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ABSTRACT 
Katherin Machalek 
The Paradox of the Putin Phenomenon:  Democracy, Fairness, and Popular Support for 
President Vladimir Putin 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
If Putin demonstrated an anti-democratic leadership style, how could so many democratic 
supporters approve of him?  This thesis examines what exactly Russians understand under 
the term democracy and how Vladimir Putin’s agenda as president touched on some of the 
values Russians associate with democracy.  Many of his policies, particularly those relating 
to the economy and the regulation of big business, tended to focus on restoring the principle 
of fairness in the everyday lives of ordinary Russians.  Studies indicate Russians associate 
fairness with functional democracy.  Evidence suggests Russians approved of Putin not so 
much for his illiberal actions, but because he paid their wages and pensions on time and 
visibly punished those who had sought to tear down fair democratic capitalism with criminal 
business activities.  Due to the particularly unfair experience of democracy in the 1990s, 
Russians embraced Putin as a proponent of democratic practices rather than an enthusiast of 
authoritarianism. 
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I.  Introduction:  Putin’s Popularity Beyond the Managed Image 
 
 Despite potentially challenging obstacles, Vladimir Putin remains one of the most 
popular leaders in Russian history.  Many characteristics and events of his presidency stand 
out as possible impediments to his popularity.  Foreign critics have warned that the 
repression of press freedoms, free speech, civil society organizations and political pluralism 
during his presidency have worked to undermine or reverse Russia’s democratic transition.  
Likewise, the seemingly endless conflict in Chechnya, massively fatal national tragedies in 
Moscow and Beslan, unpopular social reforms, and a cooling in relations with the West 
would appear to most outside observers as significant stains on Putin’s image.  Yet, none of 
these caused his popularity rating to sink significantly at any time during his presidency.  
Rather his approval loomed between 70 and 80 % throughout most of his career and 
continues to remain high even after his successor replaced his seat in office.  
 Numerous claims have been laid to explain the Putin phenomenon.  Some blame the 
influence of state controlled media for coercing public approval by protecting and building 
up his image on television, which 85% of Russians use as their main and frequently only 
informational source.  As liberal politician, Vladimir Ryshkov, reports, “day after day, hour 
 2 
after hour, television was … manipulated” for the image of the president.1  Considering the 
manipulation of the media in Soviet Russia, however, coercive attempts to positively portray 
the image of the president on television were nothing new for Russians.  These days, it would 
be difficult to win over the Russian population merely through image without providing 
visible evidence to support the image’s authenticity.  While efforts to build up and protect his 
image through Kremlin controlled media outlets inarguably contributed to his positive 
reception, ample evidence suggests that other factors contributed just as much if not more to 
his impressive popularity among the Russian public.   
Figure 1:   
HOW WOULD YOU EVALUATE PUTIN'S PERFORMANCE AS PRESIDENT: DO YOU THINK HE 
PERFORMS PERFECTLY, WELL, SATISFACTORY, BAD OR VERY BAD?2 
 
 
 (Source:  FOM population poll from December 29, 2004) 
 There are many reasons to believe that public support for Putin runs deeper than his 
managed image.  Some of those claims have their origins in the particular social, economic 
                                                 
 
1Margaret Mommsen and Angelika Nußberger, Das System Putin: Gelenkte 
Demokrate und politische Justiz in Russland (Munich: C.H.Beck oHG, 2007), 52-53. 
 
2FOM Population Poll, “Evaluations of Putin's Performance,” 29 December 2004, 
<http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/policy/services/government2/government_putin/putin/ap
praisal_2004/ed045206> (20 October 2008).  
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and political setting of the late 1990s in Russia.  Certainly, the chaotic mood of democratic 
transition and the bitter legacy of economic turmoil and government irresponsibility left 
behind by Yeltsin’s presidency created an atmosphere in which Russians were looking for a 
very particular hero.  As a commentator for RIA Novosti explained “Vladimir Putin's 
phenomenon is different: his actions coincide with Russia's dynamics and public moods.”3  
 Some critics argue that the chaotic dynamic of the democratic transition manifested in 
a Russian desire for order, which welcomed illiberal attitudes and heavy-handed, 
authoritarian leadership.  Yet, opinion polls confirm that Russians have consistently favored 
democracy over other governing forms.  Much evidence suggests that Russians disapproved 
of Yeltsin’s leadership not because they believed democracy, itself, was ineffective, but 
rather that Yeltsin’s democracy lacked essential democratic qualities.  His government 
handled public funds and industry irresponsibly, leaving ordinary Russians to suffer the 
economic repercussions.  From this perspective, Yeltsin’s attempt at democracy was, indeed, 
not democratic enough because it did not provide the environment in which its citizens could 
flourish in a free market system.  The faults of his leadership prevented Russians from 
benefiting from democracy.  Russians essentially disapproved of his government for denying 
them the experience of democracy.   
 If Putin demonstrated an anti-democratic leadership style, how, then, could so many 
democratic supporters approve of him?  Certainly, this contrast points to an interesting 
paradox in opinion.  Surveyed Russian opinion indicates that the dynamics and moods that 
provided support for Putin were, in reality, more complex than a simple longing for order or 
more authoritarian-styled leadership.  As explained by Russian political expert, Michael 
                                                 
 
3Pyotr Romanov, “Phenomenon of Vladimir Putin’s Popularity,” CDI Russia Weekly, 
17 December 2004, < http://www.cdi.org/russia/335-5.cfm> (28 October 2008). 
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McFaul, in a media conference in 2007, “if you ask Russians do you want an autocratic 
system, they say no, and by like, 80 percent say no.  They just don’t perceive the system that 
they live in today as being autocratic in the way that maybe (you)…or I do.”4  This paradox 
points to the notion that Russians may not see Putin’s leadership as particularly 
undemocratic.  Indeed, public opinion implies Russians approved of Putin because his 
policies, in enforcing a fairer and more just system for ordinary people, appeared more 
democratic, rather than less.  The quality and objectives of Putin’s leadership provided 
enough evidence to give weight to and authenticate his projected image, particularly his 
economic reforms and selective attacks oligarchs.   
 The objective of this thesis is to examine what exactly Russians understand under the 
term democracy and how Putin’s agenda as president touched on some of the values Russians 
associate with democracy.  In this way, Russians’ support for democracy is reflected in their 
approval of Putin.  I will particularly investigate how the aspect of fairness as a component of 
democracy helped bolster support for Putin because many of his policies, particularly those 
related to the economy and the regulation of big business lawlessness, tended to focus on 
restoring the principle of fairness in the everyday lives of ordinary Russians.  Previously 
under the influence of communist ideology, fairness represented equal distribution and state 
intervention based on the principle of paternalism.  This idea of fairness reflects a more 
authoritarian leaning because it appears to support the intervention of the government in 
leveling economic divides, rewarding all people equally regardless of their efforts or hard 
                                                 
 
4Michael McFaul, “Media Conference Call: ‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: 
How Putin's Crackdown Holds Russia Back’ [Rush Transcript; Federal News Service],” 
Council on Foreign Relations, 18 December 2007, 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/15118/media_conference_call.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%
2F112%2Fgideon_rose> (18 October 2008). 
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work.  However, new studies show that these old socialist values have been modified due to 
time and significant political modernization. Russian opinion has shifted towards a more-
western style version of fairness based on desert, which very much resembles the values of 
fairness demanded by citizens in many firmly democratic societies, such as the United States.   
 Putin convincingly emphasized fairness in his policies, which most Russians, in turn, 
considered to be a characteristic of properly functioning democracy—that which the 
dysfunctional democracy of the 90s lacked—rather than heavy-handed authoritarianism.    
Thus, considering the previously mentioned paradox of opinion, I intend to determine how 
Russian approval of democracy and its associated quality of fairness helped secure popular 
support for Vladimir Putin.  The fact that Russians continue to remain firmly committed to 
democratic principles does not contradict their overwhelmingly support for Putin because his 
policies fulfilled Russians’ expectations of democracy to provide a fair environment for its 
citizens, in which success rested on the principle of desert rather than lawlessness and 
preferential treatment.  Russians supported Vladimir Putin not because of his illiberal actions, 
but because he paid their wages and pensions on time and visibly punished those who had 
sought to tear down fair democratic capitalism with criminal business activities.  Due to the 
particularly unfair experience of democracy in the 1990s, Russians firmly associated fairness 
as an essential element of democracy and thus, embraced Putin as a proponent of democratic 
practices rather than an enthusiast of authoritarianism. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II. Setting the Stage for Issues that Matter:  Russian Dynamics                                
and Public Moods  
 
 How then did Putin’s ability to address the Russia’s dynamics and public moods 
contribute to his enormous popularity?  Unmistakably, many of his policies impressively 
displayed his willingness and ability to address the actual concerns of the population and this 
is what many Russians considered missing from the democracy of the 90s.  Many, in fact 
cited this lack as the source of dysfunction in Russia’s early democracy.  Considering the 
dramatic political and social changes that occurred in the democratic transition under Yeltsin, 
Russia’s dynamic and public moods largely centered on the need for more effective 
government, social stability, and especially a restoration of Russia’s global image.  
Regardless of the successes his regime contributed to the democratic transition in terms of 
institution building and pluralism, his presidency was overshadowed by the very real failures 
experienced by ordinary Russians.  From the perspective of most ordinary Russians, 
“Yeltsin’s administration set loose a wave of corruption and criminality, stumbled chaotically 
from one political crisis to another; presided over an unprecedented decline in living 
standards and collapse of life expectancy; humiliated the country by obeisance to foreign 
powers; destroyed the currency and ended in bankruptcy.”5  The Yeltsin period culminated 
                                                 
 
5Perry Anderson, “Russia’s Managed Democracy,” London Review of Books 29, no. 
2, 25 January 2007, < http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n02/ande01_.html> (21 October 2008). 
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not only in dissatisfaction with his leadership, but also the devastating financial crisis of 1998 
with the GDP falling close to 45 % and government revenues halved.6  To many, instead of 
introducing them to the benefits of market economy and democracy, the 1990s more 
resoundingly represented a period of extreme disorder, unpaid wages, fatal alcoholism, and 
the near collapse of the nation, among other disasters.  From the perspective of most 
Russians, this was not what democracy was supposed to look like.   
 While Yeltsin’s approval ratings remained low throughout his presidency, sinking 
into ultimate decent towards the end, Putin enjoyed a positive public response straight from 
the beginning.  Did this backdrop of ineffective and incomplete democratic transition 
somehow contribute to Putin’s immediate surge in popularity?  Analysis of the issue suggests 
that Vladimir Putin’s massive approval resulted not merely from a manipulation of his image, 
but rather from his particular ability to address the very concerns, which were most 
prominent in the minds of most Russians in the late 90s.  Many critics have logically 
assumed that his popularity, in part, originates from his foreign policy and its effectiveness in 
restoring Russia’s prominence, after the humiliating collapse of prestige accompanied by the 
fall of the Soviet Union. 
 
 Foreign Policy:  “To Become a Great State…,” but What About  
Pensions and Paychecks? 
 While I argue that Putin’s social policies most positively contributed to his high 
standing among Russians, many believe Putin’s strategic foreign policy caused Russia’s great 
economic and political resurgence and unsurprisingly and thus, stands out as an obvious 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
 
6
 Anderson, “Russia’s Managed Democracy.” 
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explanation for his broad approval.  Although they were not the only important accessories in 
boosting Putin’s public image, his foreign policies did undoubtedly attract popular support 
for his leadership and should notably be included when discussing the policies that responded 
to the Russian dynamics and moods of the late 90s and added to his popular success.  For 
many Russians, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its aftermath created numerous 
disasters.  Not only did Russia loose its influence on global affairs, but due to financial 
chaos, it lost much of its international economic significance.  Public polling at the start of 
Putin’s presidency reflects these concerns.  In 2002, the strongest wish of an overwhelming 
majority of Russians (70 %) was for Russia to become a great and peaceful state.  When 
asked what becoming a great and peaceful state meant, most respondents focused on the 
“great” aspect of this response, clarifying using these words: "revive"; “get up from our 
knees," "get out of the pit"; "rebound"; "Become strong and hold the world"; "be a powerful 
and respected nation," "be strong and respected, feared by the others"; "regain power"; "be a 
superpower, like the USA," "Get to the world market";  "be more powerful economically.”  
Clearly, recovering form the humiliating collapse of the Soviet Union by restoring Russia’s 
political and economic prestige appeared a clear concern for most Russians in the first years 
of Putin’s presidency.  Russians overwhelmingly expressed a desire to have influence over 
other nations, both in terms of the economy and exhibiting the political pull of a western-
style super power. 
 By no accident, Putin’s foreign policy addressed exactly these issues.  According to 
analyst Kim R. Holmes, Putin’s foreign policy always fulfilled two objectives, which 
according to the desires of the population, contributed to his popularity.  She argues Putin 
used “foreign policy as a way not only to raise revenues for the state and his political allies 
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(through arms sales and special commercial relations with China, India and Iran) but also to 
increase respect for the state among the Russians themselves.”7  Forming his foreign policies 
around four pillars, —restoring influence in the post-Soviet space, developing a strategic 
Figure 2: 
OPEN-ENDED QUESTION: PLEASE COMPLETE THE SENTENCE: "PRESENTLY, I WOULD 
VERY MUCH LIKE RUSSIA TO..."8 
 
 
  
(Source: FOM Population poll from July 25, 2002) 
energy market in the European Union, establishing an arms market with the West’s outcasts, 
China, India and Iran, and reestablishing itself as an equal in a pragmatic relationship to the 
United States—Putin addressed the economic and political aspirations of post-Yeltsin 
                                                 
 
7Kim R. Holmes, “Understanding Putin's Foreign Policy,” The Heritage Foundation:  
Leadership for America, 12 July 2001, 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/WM22.cfm>  
(25 October 2008), WebMemo #22. 
 
 
8FOM Population Poll, “Open-ended Question:  Please Complete the Sentence:  
‘Presently, I Would Very Much Like Russia to…,’” 25 July 2002, 
<http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/rus_im/Great_Power/ed022923> (29 October 2008). 
 
 10 
Russia.9  From 2001 to 2006, within just five years, the percentage of Russians who 
considered Russia to be a powerful country rose by nearly 10%.10  Clearly the priorities that 
Putin set for his foreign policies closely matched the national goals desired by a large portion 
of the population.  They boosted national pride and independence not seen since Soviet 
times.  Considering the positive responses to Putin’s foreign policies, many have pointed to 
these as reason for Putin’s sustained popularity.  Still, there were other deep concerns among 
Russians, which foreign policy reforms could not dispense.  Even with an awe-inspiring 
foreign policy, Putin could not avoid addressing the personal economic plight of average, 
hard-working Russian citizens. 
 As in any country, the average person usually pays a greater amount of attention to 
their personal affairs than the more abstract goals of the nation, even if they are highly 
valued.  From early on, more Russians hailed Putin’s achievements in the social sphere as his 
greatest merits.  In 2002, 23% of Russians valued accomplishments made in social sphere as 
his main achievements as opposed to only 5 % who considered his foreign policy to be of 
focal importance.11  Moreover, respondents considered increased pensions and allowances 
(12%), prompt payment of pensions and salaries to state workers (11%), increasing living 
standards and control over homelessness (3% each) more important than contacts with 
foreigner leaders (6%), the strengthening of Russia's position in the world (3%), improving 
                                                 
 
9Holmes, “Understanding Putin's Foreign Policy,” WebMemo #22.   
 
 
10Grigory Kertman, “Russia: Powerful or Weak?,” FOM, 8 June 2008,  
<http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/rus_im/mesto_v_mire/ed062223> (29 October 2008). 
 
 
11A. Petrova, “Putin's achievements: social and foreign policy,” FOM, 21 March 
2002, <http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/Chechnya/putin_chechnya/eof021101> 
(20 October 2008). 
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U.S.-Russia relations (1%), or payments on foreign credits (1%).12  While Russia’s standing 
in the world proved quite important to most Russians, particularly after the awkward loss of 
prestige at the end of the Soviet Union, the ineffectiveness of the new democratic system left 
many more demands of the public unfulfilled.  Putin’s policies targeted towards improving 
the everyday lives of ordinary Russians played a significant role in his mass approval 
because they actively sought to increase the fairness of the democratic system by improving 
the everyday, domestic realities of ordinary Russians.  The next sections will examine 
Russian attitudes towards democracy and its associated values.  Public opinion discloses that 
the fair image of Putin’s policies appeared to right the gravest wrongs of Russia’s 
dysfunctional democracy and thus, had a significantly positive effect on his approval ratings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
12Petrova, “Putin's achievements: social and foreign policy.”  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III. Russian Attitudes Towards Democracy   
 
 
 Many critics have suggested that the chaos that emerged out of the 1990s transition to 
democracy provoked a return to traditional and culturally specific illiberal sentiments among 
the Russian people.  These assumptions are often confirmed by and used to explain the 
unrelenting popularity of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian style leadership.13  Despite the 
claims that inherently Russians favor authoritarianism, in reality, they have surprisingly 
retained a generally positive attitude towards democracy since the fall of the Soviet Union 
regardless of difficult times.   In opinion polls of the time period up to Putin’s first term, most 
Russians still openly reject authoritarian dictatorship in favor of democratic leadership.14 
During extensive polling conducted before and after parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 1999-2000, McFaul discovered that 71.5% of Russians may be dissatisfied with how 
democracy works in Russia, but a clear majority with 58.4 % nevertheless still believed that a 
democratic system was an appropriate way of governing Russia.15  Despite disapproval from 
                                                 
 
13
 Ellen Carnaghan, Out of order : Russian political values in an imperfect world, 
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 107.   
 
 
14
 G. G. Diligensky, “Vladimir Putin and Russian Democracy (speculation on the 
2000 survey results),” FOM, 18 January 2001,  
<http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/societas/society_power/democracy/ed010130>             
(01 September 2008). 
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the public on the performance of the Duma and other elected bodies, public opinion polls 
regularly demonstrate that the majority of people consider the existing democratic 
institutions and rights and freedoms such as free elections, freedom of the press and the right 
to receive politically pluralistic information as irrevocable norms of social life.16  
Additionally, a significant number of Russians continued to be in favor of following the 
Western democratic model.  Even after the failure of radical reforms in 1997, which 
culminated in the 1998 economic crisis, 47.1 % of respondents chose “Western style 
democracy” in the form of “a state with market economy, democratic institutions, and respect 
for human rights” as the best model for future Russia.17 All of these attitudes suggest that, 
when Putin took power, most Russians clearly believed at least conceptually or ideally that 
democracy was the only appropriate game in town. 
 If democracy was, in the eyes of the people, the only appropriate governing system 
for post-communist Russia, how could an overwhelming majority—consistently 60-80%—
continue to support Putin’s authoritarian leadership?  Throughout his presidency Putin took 
on gradually increasing authoritarian measures including centralizing power, cutting the 
liberties of the media, and restraining civil society, and yet, his popularity did not falter.  
How could democratically minded people continue to staunchly support such an obviously 
authoritarian leader?  One explanation is that they neither saw his actions as demonstrating 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
15Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russian Attitudes toward 
Democracy, Markets, and the West,” Meeting report 3, no. 10, 28 March 2001, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=300 (15 October 
2008). 
 
16Diligensky, “Vladimir Putin and Russian Democracy.”  
 
 
17Guerman Diligensky and Sergei Chugrov, “‘The West’ in Russian Mentality,” 
Office for Information and Press, Brussels and Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations, Moscow, (2000), < www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/diliguenski.pdf>, (15 October 
2008), 25.  
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authoritarianism nor conflicting with their understanding of democracy.  As with any country 
in massive transition, Russians have a very complex relationship with democracy.  A more 
comprehensive understanding of this relationship helps to understand this paradox.   
  
Problems with Opinion Polls 
  Before further analyzing Russian perspectives using opinion poll data, it is important 
to address the limited nature of such polls.  First of all, their frequent inability to offer 
appropriate comparisons to respondents in other countries can lead to misleading 
conclusions.  For example, opinion polls may indicate, as I will show, that Russians are 
unable to meaningfully define democracy, which automatically raises eyebrows at their real 
understanding or appreciation for it.  These same opinion polls, however, fail to compare 
Russians’ inability to define democracy with citizens of other countries, which may have 
more experience with democracy.  Such comparisons might very well demonstrate that 
Russians are no less able to meaningfully define democracy as Americans or the Swiss.  
Secondly, basing judgments on poll responses must take into account that much depends on 
the wording of questions and whether or not poll allows for alternative responses.  This rings 
true especially in countries in democratic transition, whose citizens may express positive 
attitudes towards democracy, but not have much of an intimate understanding for its 
realization.  For example, when asked if they favor multiparty systems, most Russians as 
well as citizens of other middle and eastern European countries will undoubtedly agree 
because they know from their one-party communist past that multi-party systems are an 
aspect of democracy.  However, this sort of questioning does not allow the respondents to 
further extrapolate on how critically they understand the multiparty system.  Are they able to 
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recognize when too many parties make the system ineffective, such as occurred in Yeltsin’s 
presidency or when the system is subject to derisive manipulation, such as when “Fair 
Russian” emerged as an oppositional party to Putin’s “United Russia,” although it largely 
supported Putin and has been criticized as being oppositional only in name.  
 Alternatively, open-ended questions often result in a myriad of personal opinions, 
which may not offer much in collective weight and convolute attempts to group majority 
opinions, but on the other hand, allow for free expression.  Likewise, while intensive 
interviews may not provide insight into opinions massively distributed across the population, 
they allow respondents to speak at length and explain what they mean.  Such interviews often 
provide insights not immediately apparent in mass surveys or opinion polls and reveal 
conflicting views on issues that survey questions might overlook.  My attempt to examine the 
source of Putin’s popularity seeks to delve further into Russians’ understanding of 
democracy.  For this reason, I have consulted a collection of mass opinion polls, expert 
analysis, and Ellen Carnaghan’s study of intensive interviews compiled in her work Out of 
Order:  Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World in order to consider both majority 
and individual opinions as well as the values behind them.  Limitations of both of these 
methods, however, must be accounted for in making any conclusion on Russian political 
culture.  The following sections will examine values attributed to democracy as determined 
by Russian interpretation, either in comprehensive studies or individual interviews.
  
 
 
 
IV.  “Good” Democracy, Fairness, and the Role of Government 
 In a first step to determine how Russians could simultaneously support democracy 
and Vladimir Putin’s seemingly undemocratic leadership style, close attention must be paid 
to Russians’ understanding of democracy and its guarantees.  Then, we will examine how 
well Putin lived up to these expectations and how this potentially contributed to his 
unrelenting popularity.  Not surprisingly, opinion polls suggest that a large section of the 
population is not able to give any meaningful definition of democracy.18  While Russians 
may not be alone in being unable to define democracy, nevertheless critics point out that the 
inability to define democracy at the very least brings into question the substance behind 
Russian support for democracy and whether or not support for an undefined democracy could 
actually mislead them into supporting undemocratic movements.  Diligensky warns against 
taking Russians’ positive reception of democracy at face value arguing that, while support for 
democracy may have been high, further questioning about its meaning reveal “the concrete 
contents of the democratic ideal are too vague for the majority.  As surveys show, a mere 
9%-12% of those surveyed say they have a clear notion of democracy…Many believe that 
‘democracy is a good thing, but impossible in Russia.’   While few are able to specifically 
define what democracy is, the majority thinks positively about it.  On the one hand, this 
                                                 
 
18Bertelsmann Stiftung:  BTI 2008, “Russia Country Report,” 2007, 
<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/159.0.html> (16 May 2008).  
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could present a rather precarious relationship to the term, but on the other hand, one could 
argue that there are plenty of citizens of firmly democratic countries, who might have 
problems as well coming up with an exact definition for the term.  In any case, it raises the 
questions as to what Russians associate with democracy, if they cannot name traditional 
definitions, and what they value as the most necessary tenants for democracy in Russia.  
What do they consider to be “good” about it? 
 
 Democracy is Good Because it is Fair 
 Several analyses indicate that what Russians consider “good” about democracy is the 
enforcement of laws and principles, which promote fair procedures for all citizens.  While 
opinion polls, of course, indicate that Russians recognize such elements as multi-party 
systems and free elections as characteristic of democracy, they do not tend to emphasize 
these as the most sought after or valued of elements.  Instead of exalting the benefits of 
“well-developed party systems, vibrant civil societies, …independent media, and mature 
liberal norms embedded in society,” Russian responses often, in fact, emphasize “fairness” as 
a distinguishing quality of democracy.19 Diligensky concludes that, during the 1999-2000 
period, democracy meant something abstractly positive that was, 
 “little more than a negation of the “unfairness” of the existing political order—
whether Soviet or post-Soviet—and a wish to transform it in accordance with the 
needs and interests of ordinary people.  Democracy is an imagined ‘good’ society, 
counterpoised to a real and undemocratic one.”20 
 
                                                 
 
19Michael McFaul, “Russian Democracy:  Still Not a Lost Cause,” The Washington 
Quarterly 23:1, (2000):  162. 
 
 
20Diligensky, “Vladimir Putin and Russian Democracy.”  
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Diligensky’s findings reveal several interesting points.  For Russians, democracy is an ideal, 
which neither the Soviet regime nor the post-communist regime under Yeltsin embodied.  
They consider these regimes to have been undemocratic because of their lack of fairness and 
inability to adequately address the needs and interests of the people.  The qualities that 
Russians tended to emphasize as most important for democracy naturally happen to be the 
qualities missing from their current and past systems.  This response points to two main 
issues:  Russians are, however vaguely, at least conceptually committed to democracy and 
secondly, they disapproved of democracy under Yeltsin not because they disliked democracy 
itself, but because they believed it lacked the guarantees of fairness that a properly 
functioning democracy ensured.     
 These issues emerge again in a survey where people are asked the open-ended 
question, “How do you understand the term ‘a democratic state,’ what does it mean?” Of the 
Russians polled in November 2000, only 55% were even able to answer the question, with 
nearly half of respondents giving either no or wrong responses. A remarkable 35% of those 
who gave answers to this question stated that the “Observance of people’s rights and 
freedoms” defined democracy, but when asked open endedly what rights and freedoms they 
meant, responses included:  “In a democratic state, attention should be paid to everyone; 
we've been robbed and there is no attention paid to that, nobody is looking for the thieves – 
this means there is no democracy"; and "the defense of every person in society." Here, 
respondents indicate the observance of people’s rights and freedoms as the responsibilities of 
the government to look out for fairness in society, in which no one is left behind, that 
criminals be punished for their crimes, and that the average person receives appropriate 
attention.  Essentially, they emphasize the need of a democratic government to act 
Figure 3: 
 19 
OPEN-ENDED QUESTION: HOW DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE TERM "A DEMOCRATIC 
STATE", WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
 
 (Source:  FOM population poll from November 29, 2000) 
appropriately with its citizens in order to defend them from injustices.  Those 
polled clearly express their concerns that the state neglects its responsibility to care for and 
protect procedures of fairness for the average person.  Interestingly, a number of participants 
who chose the observance of rights and freedoms as characteristic also responded negatively 
by stating a democratic state is "a state where everything is permitted for some people, and 
the others cannot realize themselves"; "democracy exists only for some, not for everyone"; 
"democrats, after taking power, have everything, while the people have nothing".21  These 
clearly negative responses describe democracy as a system in which only some people are 
granted the ability to succeed.  This ability appears, in the opinions of these respondents, to 
have been distributed unfairly.  Previous studies have shown that when individuals are 
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evaluating democracy, they often pull from their own experiences of it and not democracy as 
an ideal.22 These responses clearly reflect the negative experiences that ordinary Russians 
endured under the dysfunctional, unfair democracy of the 90s.  They recall unfairness in 
terms of the reckless privatization and government corruption, which emptied government 
coffers, delayed wages and pensions, and led to the largely unjustified rise in economic 
inequality.  In the dysfunctional version of democracy prior to Putin, only the few benefited.  
According to Russian respondents, a correctly functioning democracy is based on principles 
of fairness, which the authorities should uphold in order for average people to enjoy the 
benefits of democracy. 
 
 Responsibility of Democratic Government to Ensure a Fair System 
 In these responses, the active rights of democracy, such as those related to political 
participation in free elections or freedom of expression, appear less pronounced.  When 
Russians consider the ideal “good” democracy, which they had not yet experienced in the 
1990s, the elements that the regime lacked first came to mind.  Yeltsin’s Russia provided for 
many institutional freedoms, including the tolerance of oppositional voices.  Nevertheless, 
his government failed to enforce laws and principles, which ensured fair practices and 
treatment of ordinary Russians.  The respondents in Diligensky’s analysis tend to focus on 
the lack of their previous leadership to pay attention to the “passive social and economic 
rights:  guarantees of personal safety and social protection, employment and material level, 
retirement allowances, free health-care, and so on.”23  While Russians appeared convinced 
                                                 
 
22Carnaghan,  Out of Order. 
 
23Diligensky, “Vladimir Putin and Russian Democracy.”  
 
 21 
that “democracy” should continue to reign as the only game on town, the people recognized 
what democracy in post-communist Russia lacked:  leadership did not fulfill its responsibility   
to guarantee people basic essentials, which they deserved and needed in order to flourish in 
democracy.  Without actions against criminal activities, without receiving just wages, due 
pensions, basic health care and job opportunities, the leadership failed to create a fair 
environment for Russia’s citizens to thrive in a democratic system.  Even Yeltsin’s leadership 
recognized how the severe discontent of Russia’s average citizens threatened his political 
legitimacy.  Yeltsin’s pre-election pledge in 1996 to make overdue wage payments and raise 
pensions makes clear his understanding that the overwhelming burdens, which average 
people faced, threatened their belief in the new political system.24  Analyst Conrad 
Namiesniowski maintains that towards the end of the 90s,  “a priority issue for the next 
Russian government (would) be the economic burden being carried by the Russian 
population.”25  The defense of fairness, while not traditionally used to define democracy, 
remained clearly an essential element to the success of Russian democracy towards the end 
of the 90s.  Not only the people, but the also the government recognized how the lack of 
fairness jeopardized the legitimacy of early Russian democracy. 
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V.  Fairness:  Values and the Communist Legacy 
 The concepts of social justice and fairness certainly have their roots in the 
Communist past.  The origins of these concepts as well as their transformation caused by 
political transition sheds significant light on the connection of fairness and democracy in the 
minds of most Russians.  By the end of the 1990s, most Russians essentially blamed Yeltsin 
for not upholding social justice by ensuring fair procedures and this caused a great amount of 
disappointment in his leadership as well as early Russian democracy.  A sense of social 
justice grew for many decades in the rhetoric of most Communist societies, even if 
paradoxically.  In exchange for citizens “‘offer(ing)’ work and politically loyal behavior, … 
(they) ‘received’ social security, ideological guardianship and the authoritarian-paternalistic 
‘caring rule’ of party and state.”26  Years of deception and denunciation, however, spread 
distrust in elites claiming to practice ‘good governance’ for the people’s social wellbeing.  
This distrust, particularly towards officials, carried over into many societies during the 
democratic revolutions of the late 80s and early 90s.  Although political leadership across 
Eastern Europe endorsed new optimism, economic revival, and responsiveness to the needs 
of the ordinary people, many of those Regimes, especially Yeltsin’s Russia, quickly revealed 
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their true intentions.  In “Values, Small Life Worlds and Communitarian Orientations:  
Ambivalent Legacies and Democratic Potentials in Post-Communist Political Cultures,” Gerd 
Meyer explains that while many believed democracy could correct the warped social justice 
of the Communist era, heightened expectations plummeted as “privileges, propaganda and 
personalization seemed to dominate politics (once again), and this helped to nourish popular, 
mistrust, old and new.”27 Hopes of genuine social justice governed by fairness lifted the 
people’s expectations of democracy, but these hopes quickly came crashing down because of 
the irresponsible behavior of early transitional leadership, whose corrupt maneuvers too 
closely resembled those of past unfair regimes.  Old mistrust magnified new distrust, making 
citizens of post-communist countries, particularly in Russia, wary of the intentions of even 
democratic elites.  
 
 Link Between Democracy and Fairness 
 For many who lived through brutally oppressive Communist regimes, Democracy 
promised to be the guarder of individual and, in general, human rights through the promotion 
of fairness.  David Mason asserts that for many Russians the element of fairness fits into the 
category of basic “human rights” that should be guaranteed in a democracy.  In most post-
communist states, fairness “is not just a matter of due process, but of social justice more 
broadly considered.  Most see social and economic inequality as a violation of basic human 
rights. It should not be surprising then, that over half of all Russians think that their 
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government has no respect for human rights at all.” 28  In the eyes of Russians, fairness is 
a particular value protected under the umbrella of human rights and should, thus, be protected 
by a democratic government.  In open-ended questioning, Russians more frequently name the 
lack of human rights as a result of too little democracy or the manifestation of the lack of 
democracy.29  The dysfunctional democracy that occurred in Russia in the 1990s lacked this  
Figure 4: 
WHY DO YOU THINK THERE IS TOO LITTLE DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA AND IN WHAT 
THINGS DOES IT MANIFEST ITSELF? (Open-ended question.)30 
 
  (Source:  FOM population poll from December 21, 2005)  
elemental value.  This might suggest that at the end of Yeltsin’s presidency the Russian  
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people were looking for a leader who would grant attention to the value of fairness and hold 
his leadership accountable for ensuring it.  A desire for pronounced fairness may reflect the 
chaotically unfair experiences that Russians endured in the 1990s.  But even if they desired a 
strong-handed leader to enforce this fairness, their idea of fairness remains linked to 
democracy and by no means suggests that Russians craved authoritarianism or rejected 
democratic leadership.  They wanted leadership that was committed to democracy’s most 
important virtues; leadership that would protect the fairness of the democratic system, which 
Russia’s previous experience of democracy lacked and personally affected the everyday lives 
of ordinary Russians. 
 
  Socialist Values Modified: Government Responsibility and the Principle of Desert  
 Russians considered “too little democracy” to be the cause for the inadequately 
functioning political system of the 1990s.  Too little democracy left the government lacking 
the initiative or authority to ensure a fair environment for its citizens to flourish in the free 
markets of democratic capitalism.  Fairness, thus, began to embody a different meaning in 
the minds of most Russians rather than merely an act of state paternalism.  As mentioned 
previously, many traditional values of fairness have their roots in the socialist period, but 
time and political transition have caused the understanding of fairness to develop in a new 
direction.  Gerd Meyer argues that while “inherited value orientations are still effective in 
paternalist expectations from the state, in the demand for social justice and equality, for more 
social responsiveness of the power elite by state interventionist policies,” these have been 
modified by equally appreciated democratic liberties, not to mention a younger, better 
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educated generation with new possibilities and perspectives.31  Public opinion suggests that 
younger, more educated Russians did not throw out socialist values of government 
responsibility.  Rather they mixed these values with more economically liberal notions of 
fairness based on desert.  Often these modified values embraced government responsibility 
not to plan the economy, but to protect it from predatory agents.  Meyer suggests that these 
modified values most likely emerged to counteract the radical neo-liberalism of the early 90s, 
which many feared gave too much preference and opportunity to small groups of 
entrepreneurs or in the eyes of many Russians, burglars of the nations wealth.  The following 
sections investigate Russian opinion on the role of the democratic government in intervening 
in the economy to ensure fair conditions for ordinary Russians to prosper.  Intensive 
interviews allow for these “modified” values to surface and naturally conflicting views on 
fairness and government responsibility emerge.  
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VI.  Modified Values:  Is fairness Compatible with Democracy?  
 Skeptics questioning Russians’ commitment to democracy argue that a longing for 
fairness is not compatible with democracy.  They suspect desires for government-ensured 
fairness, particularly in the economy, are a mere resurfacing of traditional socialist values.  
These claims, however, ignore the dynamic of “modified” socialist values as discussed 
previously.  How has the longing for a fairer system changed due to Russians experience 
with democracy and new realities?  And moreover, how has their understanding of how 
democracy and markets should function influenced their support for Putin’s economic 
policies?  The latter question will be addressed after we take a look at Russian attitudes 
towards the functioning of free markets in their experience with democracy.  In Out of 
Order:  Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World, Ellen Carnaghan investigates to 
what extent Russians believe the government should play a role in the economy.  From 
intensive interviews conducted between 1998-2003 with individuals ranging from those who 
highly support democracy to extreme skeptics, she concludes that while indeed most of the 
Russians, who participated in the study, believed that government should play significant role 
in the economy, they also quite distinctly rejected a return to the paternalistic protection of 
the planned economy.32   
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 In most interviews discussing democracy, markets and government responsibility, 
both democracy and market proponents as well as skeptics responded in remarkably similar 
ways, emphasizing the government’s responsibility to ensure the competitiveness of markets 
and workers, care for basic survival, and pay salaries and pensions in a timely fashion.  
Strong supporters of democracy commented “it seems to me that the government should play 
a direct role in efforts to improve the material situation of the people…quite a bit depends on 
the resolution of the problems they are obligated to solve:  like the payment of pensions, 
salaries, and so on.”33  Clarifying the governments role in the economy, this respondent 
believes the government is responsible for the economic situation of its citizens not 
especially through state paternalism, but rather the simple task of paying what they are 
obligated to pay.  Another respondent in the high support for markets category echoed this 
claim with “the government should take care of its people.  It should create new jobs, 
consistently increase the level of pay and the immediate survival minimum.”34  The 
government should take care of its people not buy providing handouts, but promoting 
employment and guaranteeing living wages.  Essentially, they are asking for the government 
to hold up its end of the bargain within the democratic capitalist system.  The participants in 
Carnaghan’s study clearly identify the government’s role in ensuring fairness in the economy 
as providing the right conditions in which people may, not only survive, but flourish in 
democratic capitalism. Far from expressing allegiances to hard-line socialist principles, 
Russians simply want an economic system that functions fairly by giving just payments for 
work and retirement and a guarantee of basic survival.  Reflecting on the frequent failure of 
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Yeltsin’s presidency to guarantee payment of salaries and pensions on time, these 
respondents complain about the irresponsibility of previous governments to support fair 
economic conditions for ordinary Russians, allowing them to participate in properly 
functioning a free-market, democratic society.  Through their expressions of disappointment, 
they clearly appear to desire the properly functioning elements of free-market democracy 
over any return to a state-controlled, planned economy 
 Even market skeptics in the group described the government’s role in the economy as 
an encourager rather than as an equal redistributor of wealth.  One of the skeptics in the study 
suggested, “the government should create the conditions by which the country can move 
ahead, improve.  As a consequence, the government should support precisely those people 
who create this development and movement ahead.  More than anything else, stimulate their 
activities.”35 Even if this respondent came from the market-skeptical group, he clearly 
believes that the government should help the economy function not by encouraging everyone 
to have the same, but rather helping those that work the hardest and accomplish the most.  
This attitude emphasizes the responsibility of the individual to work towards his own 
improvement.  The government should help by ensuring conditions, not necessarily success.  
Individuals should be responsible and also rewarded for their own ambitions, if they are a 
product of hard work.  This striking individualism strongly contradicts claims that Russians 
seek out a government, which will act paternally toward its citizens and provide for a more 
socialist based welfare.  On the contrary, even democracy and market skeptics appear to 
embrace the basic, individualistic tenets of democratic capitalism.   
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  Supportive of Markets, but Critical of Unfair Markets 
 Most complaints about free-market democracy revolved around their dysfunction and 
the unfair repercussions that resulted for ordinary Russians.  Particularly those who were in 
strong support of markets and democracy emphasized the limits with which the markets 
functioned during the late 90s, creating an unfair economic situation even for those willing 
and able to work hard.  While principally supportive of markets, they criticized government 
irresponsibility in maintaining market principles, allowing markets to fall prey to corruption 
and criminality at the cost of ordinary Russians salaries and pensions.  Respondents believed 
that Russian markets lacked the lawful discipline required to function properly as a 
democratic system.  It was the government’s role to develop the market responsibly and their 
disregard to for this resulted in unfair circumstances for ordinary Russians.  Participants 
consistently focus on market fairness—not necessarily market paternalism—as one of the 
missing elements that caused dysfunction.   
 A focal dysfunction of Russian markets in the 1990s was the lack of correspondence 
between the quality of work and just compensation.  This opinion could perhaps exemplify 
Meyer’s point relating to modified socialist values.  On the one hand, the individual’s 
contribution to society should make him deserving of higher compensation, but on the other 
hand, the difficulty and the zealousness of one’s work is also a factor in the amount he 
deserves.  I think, however, this trend of thinking could be found in any number of societies 
without a socialist past and has more to do with a more general adherence to the rather 
democratic principle of desert rather than constructed socialist ideologies.  For instance, most 
Russians felt that those employed in professions, which require harder work and contribute 
greatly to society, should be rewarded more than those professions that require less 
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consuming work—whether physically or intellectually—or have less meaning for society.  
One such participant complained that, “doctors are poor no matter how hard they work.  
Well, that’s the government budget sphere.”36  The government determines the salaries for 
doctors, for example, who contribute to public health, and yet regardless of whether they 
work well, it chooses to pay them poorly.  This responded distinctly criticizes the values of 
the government.  Is it fair to pay doctors poorly, if they work hard for the good of society?  
Or alternatively, is it fair to pay people poorly whether they do honest work or not?  The 
government lacks the values that work towards creating the right conditions in which people 
will be motivated to contribute to the economy and society, thus enabling them to add their 
part to living in a democracy.   
 Most respondents felt dysfunctional markets rewarded the undeserving, while at the 
same time, disadvantaged the meritorious.  When asked if hard work could improve a 
person’s material situation, another market-supporting respondent replied, “well, 
theoretically yes, of course.  Theoretically.  But at the same time, the majority of people who 
don’t know how to work well may earn more than this person.”37  Russians from different 
levels of society seemed to understand their unfair plights during the late 90s as well as those 
of the others, claiming that no matter what kind of job you have, hard work is seldom 
rewarded appropriately:  “Even the intelligentsia, people like me, work well but in principle 
it is not possible to improve our material situation.  And the same is true for workers, I know.  
I have some acquaintances, ordinary workers.  The haven’t been paid for months.”38  Here, a 
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member of the intelligentsia, a portion of society whose work was devalued by socialism, 
also complains that markets function unfairly.  Clearly, someone disadvantaged by socialist 
values would not earn for their return.  She sees herself in the same situation as ordinary 
workers; the effects of dysfunctional Russian markets go beyond social class or employment 
sector and seem to disadvantage everyone involved in legitimate work.  Instead of 
emphasizing the government’s responsibility to improve the situation for society, she stresses 
the individual’s inability to improve his own situation on account of his own merits because 
workers are simply not paid.  Empty budgets caused by government irresponsibility deny 
ordinary Russians the proper conditions to improve their personal situations.  There is little 
faith that individuals can improve their material situations based on personal initiative and 
this strikes a negative chord with many Russians, who would rather prefer democratic 
capitalism to a return to a state controlled economy.  Individuals are responsible for 
themselves, but government is responsible for providing a democratic system in which 
markets allow for individuals to provide for themselves.  Poorly functioning markets inhibit 
the democratic experience for most Russians.  Russian respondents blame this unfair 
situation on the government and its lack of attentiveness to basic democratic conditions and 
values.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
  
 
 
 
VII. Government Negligence:  Unfair Privatization and Oligarchs 
 The second most often mentioned injustice of Russia’s early free market democracy 
was the controversial liberalization of natural resources and industrial enterprises in the 
1990s, which made billionaires out of a short list of Russia’s most influential oligarchs.  In 
Carnaghan’s study, many Russians from all levels of support for democracy singled out 
privatization as representing a major government failure in defending the fairness of the new, 
vulnerable economy.  Other studies, such as the International Social Justice Project, also 
confirm that privatization was a sore point for Russians.  Most believed the government had 
irresponsibly allowed criminals to steal the nation’s wealth, which they considered to be a 
common good, and get away with it without punishment.  In the previous chapter, Russians 
complained that hard work often goes unrewarded and by working hard, one cannot 
necessarily count on improving their personal situation.  From this perspective, the fact that a 
select number of oligarchs enjoyed a vast amount of wealth by doing no work at all 
understandably appeared very unfair to most ordinary Russians.   
 Research shows Russians often look upon the rich with particular suspicion.  More 
often than respondents in other countries, Russians consider wealth to be a product of 
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dishonesty rather than hard work and ambition.39 While this skepticism could have some 
origins in socialist ideology, this opinion more likely results from the way in which 
privatization of Russian national industry made a few individuals, who happened have the 
right connections, enormously rich at the same time that most Russians struggled for basic 
subsistence.  Many consider the privatization of the 90s unfair not because assets were 
unequally distributed, but because those who benefited got rich from, as many Russians see 
it, deceitful, criminal actions rather than their honest, ingenuity or intelligence.  Polls also 
indicate that 77.5 % of Russians view the process of privatization negatively, considering it 
to have not only been unfair, but also largely criminal.40  Participants in Carnaghan’s study 
support these figures:  respondents from the entire spectrum of support for markets and 
democracy consistently reiterated the words “theft, plundering, grabbing, usurpation, (and) 
deception” when describing privatization.41  One respondent, a market and democracy 
supporter, criticized:  
“From the beginning, privatization was conducted unjustly” and “on the national 
wealth, they (oligarchs) receive dividends.  You could say, they don’t grow with the 
nation, but live by themselves.  I consider this unjust…the government lacks 
something…to change this, even though everyone thinks it is unjust.”42   
 
In his own words, he express the injustice of accumulating wealth through activities, which 
impede national development rather than cultivate it, especially when beneficiaries do not 
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actually do any work to acquire it.  This behavior preys on Russia’s strides towards full 
political transition and robs the nation of its resources.  Additionally, they complain that the 
previous leadership lacked the willingness or ability to correct this injustice.  As we will see 
in the next section, many Russians concluded that the crimes of privatization, more than just 
being unfair, prevented the economy from developing properly and ultimately hindered 
Russia’s democratic transition.   
 
 Criminal Privatization Disadvantaged Market Economy 
 Is disapproval of privatization really just a manifestation of anti-market sentiment or 
nostalgia for a controlled economy?  Studies say no.   Although Russians exhibit bitterness 
over the 1990s liberalization, this does not indicate that they whole-heartedly reject the 
initiation of private enterprise or the free market.  Rather, interviews and population polls 
show that Russians appear quite supportive of privatization as a necessary aspect of 
democratic capitalism and advantageous for Russia’s democratic development.  McFaul’s 
data suggests that despite grievances over the way in which markets were opened in Russia, 
the majority (63.5%) maintain that competition among “various enterprises, organizations, 
and firms is beneficial to society.”43  Rather than rejecting privatization altogether, they 
disagree with the way in which privatization occurred in Russia in the 1990s and think that 
the political leadership was negligent in doing more to control it.  As Carnaghan’s 
interviewees confirm, Russians exhibit animosity towards the privatization of national 
                                                 
 
43Michael McFaul, “Russian Attitudes toward Democracy, Markets, and the West,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Meeting Report 3, no.10, 2 April 2001, < 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=300> (18 October 
2008). 
 
 36 
industry not because they reject free market principles, but rather because they believe the 
irresponsible way in which industry was liberalized significantly damaged the democratic 
development of the economy and created unfair circumstances for ordinary Russians.  As one 
respondent explained, “Where people break the law, it is cataclysmic for the economy.  Well, 
for example, the case of the oligarchs, of Berezovsky.  People, having broken the law, 
created—that is, knocked together, let’s say it like that—a big fortune.  It’s illegal.  It must 
be stopped.  But the course of reforms themselves, toward a market economy, I of course 
support.”44   The complaint here is clearly not directed at economic reforms or market 
economy in general, but rather at the lawlessness of this particular privatization, which 
allowed for the massive accumulation of wealth through criminal means.   Respondents make 
a distinction between free market reforms, which are good for the economy, and illegal 
partitioning of Russian national industry into the hands of a select group of criminals, which 
turned the economy upside down.  In the minds of these respondents, the political leadership 
had the obligation to stop this national crime and its failure to do so stunted the economic 
development of Russia’s democratic transition. 
 Responses reveal that Russians believe privatization’s crimes handicapped the 
economy, particularly in its ineffectiveness to provide opportunities for ordinary, hard-
working people.  Participants assert that privatization produced economic chaos by unfairly 
rewarding individuals the nation’s wealth without having earned it and punishing those, who 
worked honestly for late wages and unpaid pensions.  Many of Carnaghan’s respondents 
show a firm commitment to markets and democracy in general, but criticize them for not 
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functioning properly.  They mostly hold the political leadership responsible for failing to 
make democracy work better for the Russian people.  As one woman explained,  
“It seems to me that our apparatus, our institutions, are sufficient.  It is simply 
necessary to try to instill new meaning in them, that is, …to make the government 
work better, to create associations so that (it) can better reflect the interests of the 
people, to demand from …the government the best solutions to problems.”45   
 
Thus, in light of the chaos of privatization and the dysfunction of Russian markets, this 
respondent looks towards the leadership for solutions.  The democratic system, itself, is not 
the problem.  She believes the leadership needs to work better and take responsibility for 
running the country, punishing those who commit crimes, and making sure that those who 
work receive their pay.  With regards to privatization, many Russians were looking for 
leadership that would cracking down on the illegal gains of the very rich returns law and 
order to the economy, creating a situation in which reforms could successfully provide 
opportunities for those who deserve them.  Consequently, those who supported actions 
against oligarchs prove not to be anti-market or anti-democracy at all, even if these actions, 
in themselves, may have appeared rather authoritarian.  On the contrary, they support 
economic reforms.  They merely want an economy governed by fair laws that would allow 
ordinary citizens to benefit from free market democracy.  Government intervention was seen, 
at this point as a means of cleaning up the system of dysfunctional elements.  Carnaghan 
concludes that to many of her respondents agreed that “containing the oligarchs was a step 
towards reducing the role of predatory interests in the Russian state.”46  Thus, the desire for 
government involvement in the economy is separated in the minds of most Russians from a 
desire for a paternalistic, controlled economy.  Rather the government has the responsibility 
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to interfere in order to ensure fairness of opportunities to those who work hard.  It has the 
obligation to protect the economy from predators, who seek to take advantage of it for their 
own interests. 
  
 
 
 
VIII.  Desire for Fairness:  Old Socialist Leaning or Typical Democratic Value?  
 Considering these sentiments, we will examine how Putin successfully fulfilled many 
of the expectations that Russians had about the government’s role in protecting the economy 
in the interest of the people.  It will be demonstrated how this success subsequently 
contributed a great deal to his astounding popularity among democracy’s supporters in 
Russia.  Before this can be discussed further, however, the issue of fairness, with respect to 
its socialist origins, must be adequately addressed in order to distinguish between old and 
new, or Soviet and post-Soviet (respectively), value orientations.  Likewise, it is necessary to 
look at how Russians’ concern for fairness compares with citizens from other firmly 
democratic countries.  Is fairness particularly a Russian concern or is it a rather basic 
principle apparent in most societies regardless of past ideological influences?   
 While Russians do tend to favor government involvement in economic affairs, the 
type of role the government ought to play has transformed.  Many Russians envision the role 
of the government in a democracy, as opposed to the old paternalistic role of the communist 
government, as centered on the need for fair governance rather than intrusive control, 
especially with regards to the economy.  Old socialistic desires for state paternalism appear 
to have been modified by more individualist ideologies in that most Russians want the 
government to play an active role, but only to ensure the proper conditions for individual’s to 
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prosper according to their accomplishments.  Essentially, they desire for the government to 
ensure that the markets reward people according to the principle of desert rather than equal 
distribution.  Although Carnaghan’s study did find evidence that those with high support for 
the markets and democracy were more likely to think that economic fairness should be 
governed by a principle of desert and than extreme market and democracy skeptics, even 
skeptics “tended to think that an equal society was a practical impossibility, and they were 
ready to reward deserving individuals with greater wealth.”47  Understandably, skeptics were 
more willing to accept inequality at the upper echelons of society than graver inequalities in 
poorer sections of society.  As one skeptic admitted,  
“let there be rich people.  Let them be—those who can do something and improve our 
lives.   But so that there would not be poor people.  Very rich and very poor, far from 
each other in their views and in their lives, do not understand each other.  I want to 
say, let the intelligent person—well, he invented something, like rockets—be 
wealthy.  He’s intelligent.  Let him live well.  But he lives on the improvement of our 
country.  He produces something.  He doesn’t just grab is like so many.”48 
 
Even those skeptical of democracy and markets, who perhaps idealistically wished for more 
economic equality, accepted that clever and ambitious individuals, who contributed to 
society, should be, based on their ingenuity, rewarded more than those who do not.  Even to 
the staunchest skeptics, this approach appears acceptably fair enough.  They, of course, 
distinguish between wealth gained through purposeful work and wealth gained by stealing, 
such as during privatization, considering only the former to be an expression of fairness.  In 
terms of their concerns for equality, these manifest themselves largely in the worry that the 
poor and the needy receive the basic necessities to live, rather than equality to all with no 
restriction.  As will be demonstrated in the next section, however, providing subsistence 
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minimums to the very needed and appropriately rewarding those who work hard proves less 
an element of leftover socialist ideology than a human concern prevalent in even the most 
economically liberal of modern societies.    
 
 What’s Fair About Democracy?:  Similarities Between Russians and Americans 
 The conflict between fairness and the inherent inequalities present in most free 
market democracies is, of course, a long debated theme.  That Russians regard economic 
fairness in terms of desert and appropriate consideration for the basic needs of the very poor 
does not vary widely from people living in more established capitalist democracies.  In fact, 
disregarding any influence of past Soviet ideologies, most democratic societies inherently 
demand a certain level of fairness in order to accept their democracies as properly 
functioning.  Fairness, once again, does not automatically denote equality.  For example, 
Russian opinions on fairness, such as the just distributions of wealth based on achievement 
and desert and emergency aide to the very needy, resemble very closely the opinions of very 
liberally democratic Americans, who certainly understand and accept dramatic social 
inequalities.  Carnaghan finds a strong similarity between Russian and American 
respondents, who were questioned on the same issues.  Americans expressed correspondingly 
similar attitudes towards the principle of desert, with distinct consideration for the very poor 
and unfortunate segments of society.  One woman explained,  
“I guess I would rather see a society where everybody has somewhat of a comfortable 
life, to a degree.  I think you should only get it, though, if you deserve it.  I don’t 
believe in getting things for nothing, so I think you should have to work for what you 
get…”49  
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and yet, another emphasized,  
 
“all people deserve the necessities of life.  Oh, well, I don’t think that we can any 
longer tolerate a society where people don’t have the necessities of life.  I mean, yes, 
individual initiative has to be rewarded, but it’s scandalous that we have homeless 
people and undernourished children and things of that sort.”50   
 
Even Americans, who are thought to more strongly support markets than socialized 
redistribution, often expressed similar concerns as market skeptical Russians.  While 
generally success should be a matter of desert, even market liberal Americans conceded that 
certain allowances should be made to the less fortunate to ensure that they receive at least the 
basic necessities.  Thus, Americans appear to seek the same level of fairness in their markets 
as most Russians regardless of their differing political pasts.   
 More broadly speaking, concepts of fairness and order appear in every country 
regardless of the political affiliation and have more to do with basic justice than ideology.  
Russian attitudes towards fairness appear quite normal when compared to those of more 
stable democratic countries.  In this context, the Russian desire for the government to do 
more about enforcing fairness appears less likely to be a longing for state paternalism present 
in more authoritarian regimes and more a typical expectation of just, democratic systems and 
competent leadership.  The next chapter will examine some of Putin’s policies and how they 
pulled upon democratic rather than authoritarian expectations, convincing Russians that he 
sought to govern Russia’s democracy by fairer principles than the previous leadership.
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IX.  Fairness and Putin´s Popularity   
 After an extensive discussion of Russian attitudes towards democracy and fairness, 
we can now relate these to the phenomenon of Putin’s popularity.  How does the Russian 
longing for fairness influence attitudes towards Putin’s political trajectory?  Could Putin’s 
authoritarian actions appear to reverse the most troubling offenses to fairness that the Russian 
people suffered during the Yeltsin years?  Evidence shows that in the eyes of ordinary 
Russians, Putin seemed to create the very conditions necessary to encourage fairness in the 
economic system and in doing so, managed to fix many of the blatant dysfunctions of 
Russian democracy.  Carnaghan attests that her respondents, both those strongly in support of 
democracy as well as skeptics, saw Putin as someone who “felt their pain.  And they thought 
he might be leading the way to a less painful economic reality, without abandoning the 
markets, but also without abandoning citizens to dysfunctional markets.”51 For example, one 
of her respondents from the intelligentsia, who, because of her education, ought to be more 
aware of Putin’s creeping authoritarianism, stated that before Putin, state institutions,  
“were in decline.  We received miserly pay.  We didn’t have anything.  For a year, 
they didn’t pay us…. With the arrival of Putin, these questions began to receive 
attention.  Resources began to be allocated for science, for the army.  My sister is a 
teacher.  She doesn’t live badly now.  My mom—she’s already elderly—she was a 
doctor before she retired…after leaving work, she also started to live better…Well, 
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and in general I like that Putin is modest in life, I feel that he doesn’t steal, that he is 
honest.  I like how he talks.  I understand all his views, positions.  That’s what 
appeals to me.  A serious consideration for our country has begun.”52 
 
With his visible attention to guaranteeing salaries, pensions, investments in education and 
science, Putin won over members of society, who otherwise would be expected to criticize 
his restriction of freedoms.  He appeared to concentrate on improving compensation to better 
match deserving professions and reward those working the hardest in Russia’s economy.  
These actions represented immediate change from the previous leadership, which seemed to 
ignore these issues and left many Russians to feel the brunt of a lawless economy. 
 Additionally, this respondent raises another factor of Putin’s popularity:  he not only 
appeals to the people for what he has accomplished, but simply because of the way he is.  
Because of his modest image, he gives many, the impression that he is willing to address the 
immediate concerns of the people.  As this respondent puts it, he shows consideration for the 
country, again presenting him in contrast to the previous leadership.  In the hearts and minds 
of many Russians, fairness and transparency were the values needed in order to reform 
democracy to provide appropriate opportunities for the people.  While to outside observers 
Putin appeared to crack down on personal liberties and convoluted transparent democratic 
practices with manipulative rhetoric, many Russians were convinced both by his actions and 
his personality that he intended to perfect Russian democracy rather than dismantle it. 
 Traditional elements of democracy such as personal liberties and freedoms may not 
have been a priority for Russians at the start of Putin’s first term, but they certainly were not 
opposed to them.  Instead Russians prioritized other conditions from his leadership, which 
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they considered as belonging to democracy:  increased government responsibility to restore 
fairness and a crack down on predatory and dysfunctional elements in the economy. 
 
Fairness and “Functional” Democracy:  How Do Russians Receive Putin’s Policies?  
 With the backdrop of the political inefficiency of the Yeltsin years, Putin's policies 
repeatedly “allowed people to find in him the desired qualities they sought:  reflection, will, 
commitment, and purposefulness,” shaping their hope in him less by his democratic merits, 
“as by the intensive need for positive changes.”53   Most importantly, Russians believed that 
Putin would finally set Russia, socially, economically and politically on a track to normalcy.  
Because of the many mis-developments of Russian democracy in the 1990s, a remarkable 
72% of Russians believed that Russia was either “only a little” normal or “not at all.”54  Most 
Russians considered a “normal society” to adhere to the principles of fairness, which 
Yeltsin’s leadership failed to endorse.   Russians polled in 2004 stated that “normal society” 
has the following qualities:  government officials treat ordinary people fairly (74%), if things 
go wrong public welfare services will help (72%), it is safe to go about the streets without 
being afraid of crime (85%), and there are opportunities for you or your children to improve 
your living conditions (85%).  Again, when discussing the concept of a “normal society” the 
same issues arise as when discussing a democratic society:  government responsibility for 
fairness, dependable welfare services in cases of emergency, decreased crime, and 
opportunities for individuals to improve their present and future conditions.  By 2004, a 
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majority of Russians believed that Putin had made significant successes in addressing these 
top issues.  Even if there was not a “normal society” in Russia at that time, 57% believed 
Russia was being steered on its way to being “normal” and will definitely become normal 
within 10 years.5556This confidence in the direction in which Putin was leading the country 
demonstrates that most Russians believe his policies transformed Russia into a country more 
resembling that of other democratic nations.  Russian opinion, in these samples, by no means 
indicates that people thought his leadership was leading Russia in a new political direction 
away from democratic consolidation.   
 In the eyes of the Russians interviewed in previous sections, a properly functioning 
democracy would have to provide and defend fair conditions for its citizens in the form of the 
timely payment of wages and pensions, increased pay for purposeful work, and consideration 
for the poor and general living standards as well as prevent criminals from unfairly exploiting 
the economy for their individual enrichment.  Russian political leadership before Putin 
secured none of these conditions, thus leaving many Russians unable to take advantage of the 
opportunities that a just democracy ideally presented. The next sections will examine how 
Putin gave the public the impression that he addressed the very concerns they voiced in 
regard to fairness.  I intend to demonstrate that his outspoken economic policy and treatment 
of oligarchs contributed to his popularity not merely for the material results they yielded, but 
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rather because they specifically addressed the values of fairness, which Russians considered 
greatly important for Russia’s democratic consolidation. 
  
 
 
 
X.  Putin´s Fair Policies:  Economic Policy 
 In Carnaghan’s study, many participants complained that the government did not do 
enough to ensure fairness in the system.  Specifically, they wanted wages and pensions paid 
on time, decent pay for professional workers, like doctors, scientists and teachers, who 
contributed to society with purposeful work, the possibility to improve one’s situation with 
hard work, opportunities to find employment, and economic consideration for the extremely 
poor.  Essentially, the wanted the economy to adhere more closely to the principle of desert. 
The positive economic times that arrived with Putin’s presidency gave a large portion of the 
population a clearly understandable reason to believe that life had become fairer for average 
Russians.  Russia experienced consistent growth as well as increases in productivity and real 
wages every year of his presidency.57 Household living standards alone rose by close to 50%, 
when 2003 is compared with 1995.58 The strengthening of the ruble caused it to increasingly 
replace the dollar as the currency of choice and encouraged the increased purchasing of 
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imported goods.   Moreover, the country’s real disposable income doubled between 1999 and 
2006 increasing consumer spending and consumer confidence in the system.59  Almost 
immediately Russians saw more money circulating to greater segments of the population.  
 Throughout his presidency, Putin appeared eager to convince the public that, “as the 
economy grows, it also “precipitates down to the material situation of the individual.”60  In 
his annual address in 2004, he stated “Our goals are absolutely clear—high living standards 
in the country, lives that are safe, free and comfortable, a mature democracy and …most 
importantly, I’ll repeat, a substantial increase in society’s well- being.”61  In the 47-minute 
address, he devoted most of speech to the resurgence of the economy and its intended impact 
on society.  He pledged poverty reduction and urged the government’s responsibility to 
guarantee affordable housing, education, and healthcare for more of the population.62 
Again, the same issues arise, which Russians identified as essentially missing elements of 
Russian democracy in the 1990s:  improved living standards, reduced crime, increased 
opportunities for everyone’s well-being.  Notably, his agenda does not exclude the 
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cultivation of democracy from his program, but rather quite obviously aggregates democratic 
principles in his economic aspirations. 
 Instead of letting national revenues disappear into the pockets of the authorities, Putin 
actually used the surpluses to pay back late wage and pension payments, resolving a 
miserable situation, which had plagued the population in the 1990s.  Russia’s economic 
recovery, which began around the same time Putin took office, allowed for his government to 
avoid future late payments of wages and pensions.  By August 2007, the average wage had 
increased to $540 per month, which while still far below European standards, marked an 
impressive increase from $65 a month in August 1999.63  In terms of poverty and social 
reform, the percentage of people living below the subsistence level lowered in 2007, 17 % 
from 30 % in 1999.64  Accordingly, Dr. Hans Henning-Schroeder comments that actual 
incomes rose every year around 10%, and the number of people with incomes under the 
subsistence level sunk from 40 million to 25 million.65  Certainly, the regular receipt of 
wages, increased salaries and living standards as well as poverty reduction all produced signs 
of restored fairness to the Russian system.  It is possible to imagine how these visible results 
made Russians believe that democracy was beginning to function properly and this was due 
to the consideration that Putin’s fairer policies had for the lives of average Russians.  
 Respondents in Carnaghan’s interviews also complained that the inability to find 
meaningful work was a substantially unfair aspect of Russian democracy before Putin.  In 
response, Putin additionally oversaw a significant drop in unemployment levels from 1999.  
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By the end of 2006, unemployment had shrunk by 3.6 million to just 5 million, improving the 
unemployment rate from 13.2 % in 1999, to less than 8 %.66  Lowered unemployment 
reflects that more people were able to find job opportunities, a condition many respondents 
of Carnaghan’s study considered to be responsibility of the government.  Putin’s leadership 
also openly used budget surpluses to fund national projects to target segments of the 
population, which Carnaghan’s respondents would consider deserving of government 
encouragement.  In 2007, $8.7 billion dollars were officially set aside for national projects 
including:  provisions “of financial assistance to the mothers of newborn children, increased 
spending on healthcare, the construction of new hospitals, increased pay for a wide range of 
doctors and nurses, the issuance of mortgage loans, construction of new housing financed by 
the budget, investment in the upgrade of mortgage loans, construction of two new 
universities and scholarships for the best students.”67  These projects tapped into the same 
groups, which the respondents of Carnaghan’s study identified as receiving unfair treatment.  
They consistently thought that more money should go to pay medical professionals and 
facilities, invest in education, and help families and children.  As one respondent echoed, “it 
is necessary (for the government) to create those conditions,” which create opportunities, and 
“limit the opportunities for economic parasitism…the state gives nothing to the family.”68  
By accomplishing these gains on fairness, Putin clearly appeared to create the conditions, 
which most Russians expected a properly functioning democracy to possess. 
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 Putin’s Image Survives Less Discussed Shortcomings 
 Still critics argue that the way in which Putin presented his economic policy touched 
much more on the issue of fairness then the outcome of his economic policies actually 
produced.  There is good reason to believe that Russia’s economic upturn after 1999 had less 
to do with Putin’s restructuring of the economy than on rising oil prices and export 
revenues.69  And when more negatively scrutinized, Putin’s economic policies, particularly in 
regard to funding education, actually appear less fair.  According to other reports, Russia 
spends less of a percentage of its GDP on education than Paraguay.70  In 2002, university 
professors were still forced to have night jobs because their salaries remained at around $100 
per month.  Even in 2007, average wages in education were “only two-thirds of the national 
rate.”71  While officially the Putin regime committed its spending to increasing wages for 
those whose good work contributed to the betterment of society, teachers and university 
professors continued to live below national averages and even subsistence minimums.   In 
these areas, Putin neglected to create the kind of environments that the people demanded in 
the Carnaghan study.  For example, even by the Ministry of Educations standards, 80-90 % 
of Russia’s institutions of higher learning in 2007 ranked below Soviet standards of quality 
and since the state provides less funding, passing examinations with bribes has become 
commonplace.72  These conditions hardly provide opportunities for fairness to succeed over 
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individuals who sought get ahead by dishonest means.  Considering these contradictory facts, 
one could also very convincingly argue that much of what Putin claimed to value served 
more to embellish his popular image than bring any real improvements to the lives of 
ordinary Russians, making his popular base, at times, appear quite at odds with his political 
agenda and anti-democratic policies73.  Nevertheless, despite selective shortcomings in his 
actual policies, Putin’s positive image largely prevailed.  Whether it was his main focus or 
not, his policies actually yielded many real results for ordinary Russians and public opinion 
consistently confirms his success in convincing a vast majority of the public that his 
leadership put the people first and sought to correct Russian democracy’s most unfair 
imperfections. 
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 XI.  Putin’s Fair Policies:  Attack on Oligarchs 
 Putin’s selective persecution of the oligarchs, who voiced themselves oppositionally, 
suggests another source from which the regime bolstered its support among the general 
population.  As respondents in Carnaghan’s study indicate, the wild privatization of the 
1990s that made billionaires out of Russia’s short list of oligarchs was broadly viewed among 
Russians—from all levels of support for democracy and markets—as illegal, unfair, and 
parasitic upon real democracy.  While Putin’s attack on oligarchs was widely praised by the 
Russian public as a long overdue governmental measure to enforce the law, western critics 
mostly accused Putin’s actions of being authoritarian in nature, having political motivations, 
and seeking to hush disagreeable outlets of free speech.  This accusation sprung from the fact 
that actions against oligarchs appeared very selectively, lashing out particularly at Putin’s 
most politically outspoken adversaries.   
 Oligarchs openly meddled in politics way before Putin arrived on the scene.  Both 
their vocal support and opposition was tolerated by the political leadership, but not 
particularly seen as a purely democratic demonstration of free speech by the Russian 
population.  Whether they benefited from their influence on politics or not, most Russians 
firmly believed that the agendas of the oligarchs were primarily motivated by self interest 
rather than any defense of freedoms or plurality of opinion.  Indeed, most of the oligarchs’ 
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initiatives unabashedly concentrated on pursing their own interests.  Most notably, oligarchs, 
like Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, used their own media to spread their personal 
political views.  At times, however, their actions inadvertently benefited the Russian people 
and certain aspects of Russia’s democratic transition.  For example, they also used their 
influence for lobbying business initiatives in the Russian Union of Industrial and 
Entrepreneurs (RSPP), which coincidentally benefited the whole country by pushing “low 
and transparent taxes, competent judiciary, reform of bureaucracy, reform of natural 
monopolies, Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization, development of small 
business and even pragmatic foreign policy.”74  Their business demands sometimes acted to 
encourage transparency, reforms and improved international relations, which actually 
somewhat helped forward Russia’s democratic transition.  Self-interest, of course, remained 
at the heart of their aims and, objectively speaking, their lobbying activities from 2000-2003 
suggest that, while pressing hard to make business practices easier, did little to help new 
entrepreneurs gain access to a better business environment.75  Regardless of the fortuitous 
contributions oligarchs made towards the development of Russia’s market, admittedly few of 
their changes impacted the lives of ordinary Russians in noticeable ways.  Russians remained 
largely suspicious of their actions and therefore, generally open to restrictions on their power 
and influence.   
 Putin, himself, was never explicitly anti-oligarch in principle.  In his first meeting 
with oligarchs after his election in 2000, Putin negotiated a pact with them in which he 
agreed to respect their property rights and avoid dragging up the issue of privatization against 
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them as long as they paid taxes and refrained from using their political clout, at least against 
him.76  Thus, he made the conditions under which he was willing to tolerate them clear from 
the beginning.  Surprisingly, evidence shows that most Russians were also aware of this pact, 
with 57 % claming that they knew of it.77  This did not appear to conflict with their image of 
Putin as a democratic leader because this pact forced many oligarchs to adhere to the rules, 
which the public considered not only acceptable, but better for society as a whole.  From the 
perspective of many ordinary Russians, oligarchs did not flout the benefits of freedom of 
expression.  Instead they used their money to influence the government in their favor.  Thus, 
reducing political influence of Oligarchs would reduce an influence of their self-interests in 
Russian politics and had little to do with restricting personal or political freedoms.   
 
NTV Affair and Putin’s “Non-Involvement” 
 The NTV affair demonstrates an interesting example of Putin’s unrelenting popularity 
prevailing over his intended image.  Although the official Kremlin story held that Putin was 
not involved in the seizure of NTV, his reputation as the defender of fairness, coupled with 
the negative reputation of oligarchs for being unfair to the economic development of Russia 
as a whole, led many Russians to willingly and positively associate him with the attack on 
Gusinsky’s media emporium anyway.  Because Gusinsky had made a name for himself as an 
outspoken critic of Putin’s leadership, western media and those within Russia, who already 
politically opposed Putin, naturally interpreted the NTV affair to have political 
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implications.78  In the international media, state seizure of NTV was a blatant gesture of 
Putin’s increased authoritarian control of the media.   Domestically, however, this action 
gave a different impression. 
 Due to the fact that most Russians actually supported Putin and believed him to be 
strengthening Russia’s democracy rather than weakening it, the majority of the population 
obviously rejected the insinuation that the NTV seizure was another example of Putin’s 
increasingly authoritarian policies.  FOM surveys indicate the “Putin factor” prevented many 
Russians from suspecting political motives, since many who trusted the presidents values 
could not believe he would manipulated the event for undemocratic purposes.79  
Understandably, from the perspective of many Russians, Gusinsky had simply broken the 
pact and overstepped the justifiable restrictions, which Putin had placed on the influence of 
oligarchs.  The fact that Putin’s pact with the oligarchs was not a secret probably contributed 
to Putin’s initial unwillingness to use the “protector of fairness” approach in his attack on 
Vladimir Gusinsky’s NTV network.  The managers of Putin’s image must have known that 
the public would pay attention to the NTV affair.  Since 85 % of Russians report television as 
their primary informational source and the channel enjoyed enormous popularity, the action 
required special attention not to conflict with the Putin’s public image.80  Therefore, the 
official version, propagated by the Kremlin, state run television, newspapers, and supposedly 
neutral journalists, insisted that the seizure of NTV was merely an economic conflict between 
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two major corporations, one of which was accused of owing a fortune in unpaid taxes.  
According to this version of events, the takeover was “not a defeat of the freedom of the 
press, but a triumph of the no less democratic principle of private property.”81  Thus, the 
Kremlin attempted to maintain that the seizure was in the defense of other democratic rights 
and had nothing to do with the infringement of free speech.  Clearly, the regime believed that 
this type of diversion would direct the public’s attention on the leadership’s defense of 
democracy and discount arguments that it intended the opposite.  Kremlin spin-doctors, 
however, did not account for the already distinctly powerful image of the president as a 
guarder of fairness and how this would impact the public’s interpretation of state enforced 
actions against a group, which most considered to be predatory upon national interests. 
 Russians tended to positively associate Putin with the actions against the oligarchs  
because of his popular reputation and many rhetorical commitments to defending democracy 
through the restoration of fair procedures.  Although many Russians refused to believe that 
Putin would use the attacks on oligarchs in order to strengthen authoritarian control on the 
media, some did, for this reason, believe that he was nevertheless involved in the attacks for 
other reasons.  Many (about one third) could not believe in the complete non-involvement of 
the president.  Furthermore, a relative majority stated that, in situations where the integrity of 
justice is at stake, Putin had the obligation to interfere.  They believed many of the events 
leading up to the closure of NTV (i.e. tax evasion, illegitimate acquisition of industry) 
occurred without concern for the interest of the public.82 While the government seemed wary 
of involving Putin’s image in an affair that might actually contradict his performance (after 
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all, he did condone the wealth gained through privatization by most), the public appeared to 
trust so deeply that Putin possessed the values to defend their interests that many remained 
convinced of his involvement as a matter of justice, even at the regimes preference for 
keeping Putin out of it.  The regime insisted on the political neutrality of the takeover, but 
Putin’s reputation and image as a defender of fairness automatically forced his association 
with the takeover in the minds of most Russians.   
 
 Values Shape Opinion:  Putin’s Image vs. the Oligarchs 
 As it turns out, regardless of what anti-Putin and pro-regime sources intended to get 
across to the people, the largest percentage of Russians (about 60 %) believed neither the 
West’s version of the story, which criticized Putin’s authoritarian actions, nor the Kremlin-
backed version, which claimed his non-involvement.  In open-ended questions, many cited 
oligarchs as responsible for this lawless, unprincipled struggle for personal power and 
property.83  Some go as far as to make anti-Semitic or anti-western remarks (“Jews sharing 
money” or “they want to sell NTV to foreigners”), but most respondents unwillingly 
specified whose interests were behind the affair and sufficed to vaguely negative conclusions 
that the incident had neither to do with freedom of speech nor private property, but simple 
lawlessness that needed to be contained.84  Russians seemed disinterested in explaining the 
takeover in terms of more generic democratic principles like freedom of speech or private 
property.  Instead, they appeared overwhelmingly concerned with the unfairness and 
lawlessness with which most oligarchs, lumped into one group, had acquired and maintained 
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their businesses and welcomed any action to correct this as a reestablishment of fairness.  
Because they felt that Russia’s fledgling economy, including their personal economic 
situations, as well as Russia’s democratic development had been compromised by the actions 
of oligarchs, the correction of their lawlessness resounded as the most important result of the 
takeover.  It must have come as a surprise to Kremlin spin-doctors in their first attempt at 
taming the oligarchs that neither effort to influence the public’s attitude had much success.  
In the end, Russians retained their original prejudices of big business and criminals, who 
make money off of nothing.  In the end, they believed their own version of the story, which 
reflected their attitudes towards the many problems of Russia’s dysfunctional free market 
democracy.   Even though Putin claimed non-involvement, his policies and his image as a 
supporter of fairness and democracy made his influence on punishing these criminals logical 
from the perspective of most Russians.  The takeover of NTV was more of a response to 
criminality rather than any political action of his own agenda.  This response was a sign to 
the public that Putin fulfilled his image as president ready to strengthen Russian democracy 
by restoring the principle of fairness.  What the oligarchs had done to the Russian economy 
was criminal and unfair, culminating in economic chaos and the weakening of Russian 
democracy.  Through his image, Putin was automatically associated with this attack and it 
contributed positively to his public reception because it touched on the bitter injustices of 
Russia’s dysfunctional democratic transition.  
 This perspective supports the conclusions Carnaghan came to with her respondents 
who believed that the containment of oligarchs “was a step towards reducing the role of 
predatory interests” in Russian democracy, regardless of the official story (usually tax 
evasion) surrounding their apprehensions.  Carnaghan asserts that, to her respondents, the 
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crack down on oligarchs consistently represented a “pushing for capitalism that benefits the 
population broadly as well as for a political system that protects individual rights and 
provides security from criminals, from business unbounded by law, and from arbitrary 
authorities.”85  Many of the practices that Putin carried out during his presidency, particularly 
centralizing the economy and attacking press freedoms via oligarchs, may have been 
interpreted by the West as authoritarian, but Russian reactions to these actions suggest that 
they actually saw them as restoring the fairness that a stabile democracy needed to provide 
the opportunities which its hard working citizens deserved.  Because Putin’s actions tended 
to touch on these soar spots of unfairness, the public often saw his interference in these 
situations to be an exhibition of Putin sharing their democratic values.  Thus, his economic 
reforms as well as his selective, though highly visible attacks on the oligarchs contributed to 
Putin’s sustained popularity and the belief that he was actually steering Russia closer to 
democracy rather than further away. 
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XII.  Conclusion:  Putin’s Democracy? 
 Russian attitudes towards democracy clearly indicate that they neither craved heavy-
handed authoritarianism nor a paternalistic state.  They merely craved the elements of 
democracy which Russian democracy lacked in the 1990s:  a fair system ensured by the 
government to function properly and reward hard working citizens on the principle of desert.  
While Russians may have been looking for stronger government intervention, this hardly 
conflicted with democracy because what prevented democracy from functioning properly in 
Russia, was the lack of government enforced rules to protect fair opportunities for ordinary 
Russians.  In the eyes of Russians, fair opportunities were essential elements of properly 
functioning democracies. 
 Although some critics argue that Vladimir Putin’s consistently high approval ratings 
reflect latent illiberal tendencies amidst the Russian people, significant evidence suggests that 
while Russians may have been looking for fairness and perhaps have tolerated a firm 
governmental hand to reinforce it, most Russians remain undeniably committed at least to 
their own definition of democracy.  Stephen Whitefield’s findings attest that the percentage 
of respondents who agree that Russia needs a government with a “strong hand” to resolve its 
economic problems increased during Putin’s presidency with a clear majority in favor.  
However, when asked “Would it be worthwhile to support a leader who could solve the main 
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problems facing Russia today even if he overthrew democracy?” the percentage of those in 
favor only increases slightly with less than a majority in agreement as well as an increase in 
those who “strongly disagree”.86  Other data, measuring the distribution of norms and 
attitudes over the period, lead Whitefield and colleagues to conclude “there is absolutely no 
evidence that democracy in Russia is more positively evaluated because of a growing 
association with anti-democratic outlooks” and results “suggest that Russians do not appear 
to approve of Putin because he delivers to them desired delegative leadership or anti-
democratic and illiberal policies.”87  If Whitefield’s analysis proves true, than Putin’s 
popularity cannot lie in growing illiberal tendencies among the Russian public.   
Figure 5: 
DO YOU THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR MOST RUSSIANS THAT RUSSIA IS A DEMOCRATIC 
COUNTRY?88 
 
 
  (Source: FOM Population poll from December 31, 2005) 
 In fact, a paradox exists between popular support for democracy and high public 
approval for Vladimir Putin.  A strong majority of Russians favor democracy and think it is 
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important to most Russians that Russia remain a democratic country.   Accordingly they 
consider the enforcement of fair procedures an essential element of defending the integrity of 
Russian democracy.  Putin won tremendous appeal by targeting the spheres of society where 
Russians felt things functioned the least fairly.  By shaping his policies to meet the Russians’ 
expectations of democracy, Putin managed to convince the people that his leadership was 
particularly democratic.  For this reason, public opinion indicates that Russians reject the 
idea that Putin’s leadership threatens democratic consolidation in Russia.  Even with his 
strongly criticized moved to centralize the state and attack civil liberties, on the contrary, 
Russians view Putin as the most democratic Russian leader in history.89  Carnaghan supports 
this peculiarity by noting that, regardless of the economic  
Figure 6: 
UNDER WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING LEADERS, IN YOUR VIEW, WAS RUSSIA THE MOST 
DEMOCRATIC? (One response allowed per card.)90 
 
  (Source:  FOM population poll from December 31, 2005) 
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situation of her participants, they were overwhelmingly confident that Russia was on the 
right track and the Putin’s leadership “had the interests of the majority at heart.”91  Some 
were unemployed and some were the victims of wage cuts, but instead of seeing themselves 
as victims of democracy, they continued to staunchly support it, criticizing the way in which 
democracy functioned in Russia instead of its validity as a governing system.  Carnaghan 
testifies that the “respondents’ assessments of government performance were influenced by 
what they expected government to do,” and not merely on the actual outputs of that 
performance and the effect it had on their lives.92  Essentially, values and procedures played 
a significant role in their evaluation of the Putin´s performance, even if subtly or indirectly.   
Russians clearly could not recognize the contradiction of support for Putin and support for 
democracy.  To most, he embodied the essential values of democracy more than any other 
Russian leader. 
 Putin’s regime attempted to transmit the image that he reordered the chaos of the 90s 
into a democratic system that functioned fairly and prioritized its citizens.  Several critics 
agree that Putin’s popularity largely survived his leadership’s shortcomings due to his 
powerfully resistant image, which was manipulated through many means.  As discussed in 
the introduction, Henning-Schroeder confirms that the media, which gradually over the Putin 
era became almost entirely state controlled, pushed his image as the president who cares for 
the “little guy.”93 Both his economic policies and his regime’s attack on the oligarchs also 
purposefully appeared to target and bring justice to the democratic experience of the average 
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Russian.  Opinion polls indicate that despite the fact that the regime failed to live up to its 
image in all circumstances, Russians generally believed that Putin, himself, remained 
committed to the interests of the people.  A similar percentage of people who approved of 
Putin in general, also believed that Putin was adequately informed about the public’s mood 
(average 60 %) and almost half the respondents believed that, in the instances where the 
regime failed, Putin, himself was not satisfied with the result of his work.94  Thus, it seems 
clear that most of the Russian public was able to overlook certain failures of Putin’s regime 
because Putin portrayed himself as a man who embodied the value of fairness and even when 
his performance fell short of their expectations, their support for him remained in the values 
he claimed to possess. 
 Certainly, many factors, including control of the media and his favored foreign 
policy, contributed to Vladimir Putin’s sustained popularity, but his image as the defender of 
fair policies for ordinary Russians impacted the public’s approval of him substantially.  Both 
opinion polls and intensive interviews confirm that Vladimir Putin’s policies in the social 
sphere and those pertaining to the oligarchs struck a personal chord with many Russians, 
making his actions in these areas highly contributory to his high approval rating.  They linked 
his pledge to uphold fairness with a commitment to democracy.  Clearly, Putin's ability to 
project an image of a democratic leader, according to the expectations of the public, 
contributed to the spectacular contradiction between his popularity--amidst a democratically 
enthusiastic population—and his obviously authoritarian leadership style.  Success in shaping 
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his policies to appear fair significantly effected his warm public reception and offers another 
convincing explanation for the phenomenon of his popularity. 
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